Information Observatory

Resources related to the CORE project

Summary of resources provided by the Core Information Observatory

The CORE Information Observatory contains regular reviews and updates on supply chain security and trade facilitatioh policies, regulations, standards and best practices. The primary focus is on the European Union and its main trading partners.

The listing below shows summary details of the most recently-added items.

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  • 2017
  • Using business complexity to handle supply chain risk: Dealing with borders of cargo liability (CORE1209)

    02 January 2017

    Summary:

    The dominant part of the academic literature on supply chain management assumes that decisions are based on objectivity, determinism and rational choices. They consider seldom complexity of the networks and casting defects that are due to deviating organizational structures and information systems. In order to manage complex risks companies may be willing to make decisions that reduce their own risks at the expense of other supply chain partners. That is an old maid game. The paper presents two cases, where logistics actors confine one-sided own liabilities instead of reducing risks in the whole network. The paper can be viewed here: http://www.intechopen.com.

  • 2016
  • Managing the Unexpected – Sustained Performance in a Complex World (CORE1208)

    16 December 2016

    Summary:

    The book highlights characteristics of organizations that are capable to improve efficiency and manage their risk in challenging operative environments. According to the writers these high reliable organizations pay especially attention to small failures, real-time operations, alternative pathways to keep going and mobilization of expertise. The book presents how quality and continuous improvement philosophy eroded in manufacturing company causing a recall of 10 million vehicles and how they recovered from the crisis. The book can be purchased here www.wiley.com.

  • Towards Trusted Trade-lanes (CORE1207)

    06 December 2016

    Summary:

    The paper explores the concept of trusted trade-lane. In trusted trade-lanes operators implement an internal control system that makes possible to detect, handle and report dubious events in a way that meet requirements of customs agencies. Writers identify three essential characteristics of trusted trade-lanes: single partners are considered reliable and trustworthy, collaboration is based on long-term partnerships powered by viable business opportunities and managed by a clear decision-making mechanism, and control systems ensures integrity of traded goods and transferred data. In addition, the paper presents three alternative scenarios how the trusted partnerships can be designed in cross-border trade. The paper can be viewed here: https://pure.uvt.nl.

  • Integrating carrier selection with supplier selection decisions to improve supply chain security (CORE1206)

    25 November 2016

    Summary:

    The paper describes a collaborative decision making process that makes possible to select optimal combination of suppliers and carriers that meet both business operational and security requirements. Security information is quantified in order to create a pool of qualified suppliers and logistics providers. Quantification enables to incorporate security with other business criteria such as price, delivery and quality into an optimization model. Logistics and purchasing managers can use the model to analyze the tradeoff between these criteria. The paper can be viewed here: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.

  • Assessing the drivers of change for cross-border supply chains (CORE1205)

    22 November 2016

    Summary:

    This paper explores the main global change drivers and how they impact on international supply chain management in the next two decades. The Delhi method is adapted to structure communication, to produce well-grounded opinions and counter-arguments, and to find consensus among selected experts. The results highlight efficient networking and business-to-business and business-to-government collaboration as core supply chain management competences. The paper can be viewed here: http://www.emeraldinsight.com.

  • Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks (CORE1204)

    11 November 2016

    Summary:

    The requirement for 100% container scanning has been a burning topic, since U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued the initiative in order to prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destructions into the U.S. The paper explores how much it is reasonable to come down from the 100% inspection rate, if deterrence and cost of retaliation are considered in the model. Deterrence means the power to dissuade an attacker from attempting to smuggle weapons as opposite to use coerce or compel.  Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred by an attacker e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network. It is assumed the defender discloses in advance how many containers are inspected. The paper can be viewed here: https://www.researchgate.net.

  • Progress in combating cigarette smuggling: controlling the supply chain (CORE1203)

    09 November 2016

    Summary:

    The paper presents cases how government agencies have reduced illicit tobacco trade by making the industry liable for controlling their supply chains. Tobacco companies were required to monitor the movement of lawfully manufactured tobacco products in their supply chains, and even retrospectively track the route taken when products were seized due to suspected excise fraud. According the paper illicit trade was substantially reduced, if manufacturers stopped delivering lawfully manufactured tobacco products in amounts that exceeded the tobacco market in the countries with lower excise duties. The criminal market dried out due to unavailability of illicit tobacco products that had been smuggled to the countries of higher excise duties by organized criminal groups. The document can be viewed at: http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com.

  • Conflict resolution in supply chain security, 2009 (CORE1202)

    02 November 2016

    Summary:

    The paper presents a mathematical tool for conflict resolution based on conflict modeling theories. Decision and policy making on supply chain security is sensitive to technical, political, environmental, ethical and economical aspects. What aspects are emphasized depends on whom we ask. Consequently, broadly endorsed decisions and policies require balancing between these dimensions.  The presented conflict resolution approach identifies involved decision makers, their individual and collective goals and gives options how to agree on security interventions. A case study on trade facilitation and security enforcement illuminates the approach. The article can be purchased at: http://www.inderscienceonline.com.

  • The effect of supply chain security management on security performance in container shipping operations, 2012 (CORE1201)

    31 October 2016

    Summary:

    The study creates a supply chain security framework that can be adapted on assessing how security management measures affect on safety and customs clearance performance in container shipping firms. Security management interventions are clustered in four categories: facility and cargo management, accident prevention and processing, information management, and partner relationship management. Findings indicated that container shipping firms that mainly focus on facility and cargo management and less on partner relationship management are generally more dissatisfied with their company’s customs clearance performance than companies that prioritize partnerships with governmental and commercial companies. The governmental agencies and commercial actors can employ supply chain security management framework, its attributes and dimensions in order to assess the supply chain security performance of container shipping firms.  The reviewed document is available at: http://dx.doi.org.

  • Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation, 2009 (CORE1200)

    26 October 2016

    Summary:

    Supply chain security culture (SCSC) is as an overall organizational philosophy embracing norms and values that keep employees vigilant when performing supply chain security practices. The article presents a scale that makes possible to gauge supply chain security culture and its correlation to organization’s ability to respond to unexpected disruptions. Employees are asked to assess two topics: security strategy of the company and impacts of significant supply chain breech to business operations. According the study improved supply chain security culture makes company more resilient against major disruptions. This research helps executives to justify their expenditures on security efforts. The reviewed document can be purchased here: http://dx.doi.org.

  • Review of The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber Vulnerabilities, Policy Paper, July 2013, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence (CORE1095)

    15 July 2016

    Summary:

    In a 50-page policy paper by the Brookings Institute and authored by Commander Joseph Kramek of the U.S.Coast Guard and a Federal Executive Fellow at the institute, the current state of affairs related to vulnerabilities at our national seaports is discussed and options to shore up cyber security are presented. In the executive summary, Commander Kramek writes that today's U.S. port facilities rely as much upon networked computer and control systems as they do upon stevedores to ensure the flow of maritime commerce that the economy, homeland, and national security depend upon. Yet, unlike other sectors of critical infrastructure, little attention has been paid to the networked systems that undergird port operations.

  • Enhancing security through efficiency focus- Insights from a multiple stakeholder pilot implementation (Sternberg et al. 2012)

    30 June 2016

    Summary:

    Efficiency and security are said to be opposing goals of logistics operations: when security goes up, efficiency decreases, and vice versa. Yet, it is suggested that information technologies could improve efficiency and security simultaneously. Sternberg et al. (2012) investigate this hypothesis: whether and to what extent increased attention to efficiency results in improved security in carrier operations in a seaport context. In a longitudinal case study, they research carrier operations in connection with port terminals carrying out Roll-in Roll-out (RoRo) operations on trailers at the port of Gothenburg. They find that investments in new ICT solutions, in fact, remove some of the barriers to higher efficiency and improve security against cargo theft and terrorism. In particular, they report that ICT investments increased efficiency in terms of reduced waiting times and increased ability to plan port operations (pre-arrival notification) and fast positioning of trailers in a port. The new ICT solutions also increased security in terms of more secure document handling (decreases the risk that sensitive information falls into the hands of criminals), better anomaly detection (helps customs identify trailers that are most likely tampered in-transit) and increased visibility.

  • Global supply chain design considerations: Mitigating product safety and security risks (Speier et al. 2011)

    30 June 2016

    Summary:

    There is a broad consensus among supply chain professionals that supply chain disruptions are very bad for business: supply chain glitches commonly lower operational performance and reduce shareholder value. Regardless of this, there is surprisingly little research on supply chain design strategies that have the highest potential to mitigate the risk of disruptions. Based on interviews with 75 US-based managers, an industry survey and a case study, Speier et al. (2011) identify types of SCS strategies and examine how contextual factors influence business managers to select a set of SCS design strategies. They argue that the depth and breadth of security initiatives depend mainly on top management mindfulness, operational complexity, product risk and coupling.

  • Supply chain efficiency and security: Coordination for collaborative investment in technology (Lee et al. 2011)

    30 June 2016

    Summary:

    Information technologies often provide significant benefits for companies in terms of better logistics efficiency and security. But despite of this fact, many companies in the logistics sector have not adopted such technologies to a high extent as one would expect. In their research paper, Lee et al. (2011) investigate coordination problems and related incentive mechanisms between manufacturers and retailers in a two-echelon supply chain, when companies are investing in ICT technologies that have potential to improve both logistics efficiency and security. Using mathematical modeling, they find that relative strengths of efficiency and security concerns result in different coordination problems when implementing a technology. To increase overcome coordination problems and reach the optimal level of ICT investments, the authors propose imposing penalties on parties, that are responsible for security breaches, and introducing tax incentives. They conclude that IT-based supply chain security solutions have a high potential for increasing both security and logistics performance through higher supply chain visibility.

  • Controlling access to pick-up and delivery vans: the cost of alternative measures (Haelterman et al. 2012)

    30 June 2016

    Summary:

    The situational crime prevention theory suggests that preventive security measures often backfire. For this reason, it is problematic that many managers do not have a holistic picture which kind of considerations should precede selection of implementation of security measures. A paper by Haelterman et al. (2012) tests the practical feasibility of a new management model that is designed to highlight the most promising preventive security measures given a set of preconditions and costs. The authors apply this model in the context of pick-up and delivery van operations at a Belgian branch of a major express courier company. Such transport operations are subject to risk of theft and terrorism, especially if unauthorized people managed break into pick-up and delivery vans. To test the management model, the authors collect views of of supply chain practitioners in two expert panels and through a survey. Their analysis covers a broad array of preventive security measures including key card, audible alarm, silent alarm + GPS, notification on vehicles, awareness training, no company logos, formal instructions / compliance checks & sanctioning, double drivers, over security escorts.

  • The displacement effect in cargo theft (Ekwall 2009)

    30 June 2016

    Summary:

    Cargo theft has always been a problem for shippers and logistics service providers. Even so, regardless of the persistent efforts to reduce cargo theft, crime continues to strive. This classic supply chain security paper by Daniel Ekwall analyzes and explains why cargo theft continues to occur in the transport network despite all implemented countermeasures. Focusing on Swedish transport and logistics facilities, the Ekwall’s research builds on interviews with six subject matter experts, survey with four terminal operators, and macro-statistics from TAPA (Transported Asset Protection Association). The paper finds some evidence on crime displacement in terms of method (modus operandi): cargo thieves target increasingly cargo in-transit because logistics facilities are nowadays better protected. However, displacement is likely to be partial in contrast to complete displacement. This means that absolute theft risk can be reduced.

  • Estimating the Operational Impact of Container Inspections at International Ports (Bakshi et al. 2011)

    30 June 2016

    Summary:

    The US government is pushing a new 100 % screening regime for US-bound containers in foreign ports to mitigate the risk of weapons of mass destruction entering US soil. The 100 % regime, however, is a major concern for foreign port operators because the current Container Security Initiative (CSI) regime seems not to be scalable for high inspection rates. The paper of Bakshi et al. (2011) simulate impacts of two container inspection regimes (the CSI and a new one) in terms of port congestion, handling cost and dwell time. To carry out the simulation, the authors use discrete event queuing network simulation with real container movement data from two of the world’s busiest container terminals. The analysis shows that cargo inspections many times disrupt optimized logistics processes at seaports. In particular, inspections extend the transportation leadtime because shipments lose time as they (i) are moved to an inspection site, (ii) queue for inspection to start, (iii) pass inspections themselves.

  • Supply chain security orientation: conceptual development and a proposed framework (Autry and Bobbit 2008)

    30 June 2016

    Summary:

    Even though supply chain security has become an increasingly important managerial domain, there is little understanding about what security aware firms are, what enables and drives security awareness, and what are the outcomes of supply chain security (SCS) orientation. Autry and Bobbit (2008) set out conceptualize, validate and operationalize the construct of SCS orientation. Based on 31 interviews with US-based managers, they conclude that SCS orientation comprises four general categories of security solutions: security preparation and planning, security-related partnerships, organizational adaptation and security-dedicated communications and technology. The authors write that these security solutions “could result in supply chain risk management-related efficiencies, such as decreased lead times to customers, greater product reliability, waste reduction, and increased delivery reliability, due to the lessened need for operations workers to perform security-related tasks such as redundant container checking, securing shipments, or other similar tasks.”

  • MARITIME SECURITY – Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, GAO, March 2009 (CORE1065)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    The US government considers identification and tracking of vessels at the US coastal areas, inland waterways and ports important for protecting the US homeland and economy from maritime terrorism.


    The US coastal guards use a range of identification and tracking solutions to detect any anomalies in maritime traffic that might suggest terrorist activity, such as transportation of weapons of mass destruction, use of explosive-laden boats as weapons, smuggling of weapons, drugs, people or other contraband. This GAO report reviews the US Coast Guards’ current and future solutions for monitoring the maritime traffic: long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT), long-range automatic identification system (AIS) and various radar and camera systems.

    The report elaborates strengths and weaknesses of these identification and tracking solutions and proposes a roadmap for further strengthening of the US coastal security. The future advancements should pay particular attention to tracking of small and non-commercial vessels and to reconsider ways to collect and analyze data that is relevant for coastal surveillance. Offering background information about vessel-level tracking and tracing of maritime cargo movements, the report is a relevant source document for those CORE demonstrations that involve shipping of containers from, through and into the US.

  • MARITIME SECURITY – DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security, GAO, July 2010 (CORE1064)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO report analyses the progress the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made in maritime supply chain security over the past five to ten years. The report raises problems that the DHS and its component agencies – the Coast Guard and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) – have encountered regarding improvement of risk management, reduction of the vulnerability to threats of small vessels, implementation of security assessment in foreign ports, and the overall progress in supply chain security.

    The report states that so far the Coast Guard has carried out risk assessments, but their results do not allow effective comparison and prioritization of risks across ports. The Coast guard has also identified points of vulnerability related to waterside attacks by small vessels, reached out to the general public to encourage recreational sailors to report anomalies, started tracking of small vessel, tested equipment to screen small vessels for nuclear material and conducted security maneuvers such as vessel escorts. Nevertheless, resource constraints and technical problems prevent the Coast Guard to protect the US coastline and maritime infrastructure from small-vessel threats effectively. Moreover, the Coast
    Guard has been assessing security in foreign ports, but the lack of the agency’s resources and certain countries’ reluctance to collaborate with the US authorities have slowed down the global security assessment. Finally, as for the general supply chain security, the DHS has been running the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) in foreign ports to test the feasibility of the 100% scanning of US-bound shipping containers with non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies and radiation detection equipment.

    The findings of the SFI pilots indicate that the 100% scanning is not a feasible policy because it would disrupt port logistics, damage international trade and raise healthy concerns, among other things.

  • AVIATION SECURITY – Progress Made, but Challenges Persist in Meeting the Screening Mandate for Air Cargo, GAO, March 2011 (CORE1062)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO report reviews the recent progress of the US air cargo security scheme.

    The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the main agency responsible for the US air cargo security, has been working towards the implementation of the 100% screening requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. So far TSA has set up a voluntary Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) to allow trusted logistics operators to screen air cargo outside congested airports, launched a program for testing technologies for air cargo screening and expanding its program for approving explosive detection dog teams. The main obstacle in meeting the 100% screening requirement is that TSA has no reliable mechanism for verifying screening data from domestic foreign screening operators, which selfreport the data. TSA also struggles in finding resources to employ as many transport security inspectors as it is required to oversee the Certified Cargo Screening Program.

    The report also points out that the current technologies that TSA has approved for cargo screening cannot screen large cargo units – pallets or unit loading devices (ULDs) – and this incapability reduces speed and cost-efficiency of air cargo screening. Overall, this GAO document provides a general outlook on state and challenges the US air cargo security regime, and therefore those CORE demonstrations that focus on the US-bound or US-origin air transport should consider the report as a key source material.

  • MARITIME SECURITY – Progress Made, but further actions needed to secure the maritime energy supply, GAO, August 2011 (CORE1061)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    The GAO report discusses actions the US Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have taken to strengthen security of energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure – that produces, transports, or receives oil and natural gas – from terrorist attacks.

    The report’s key recommendation is that the Coast Guard need to assess risks to all offshore facilities in the US territorial waters, to improve
    emergency response plans in case of oil spills and to design performance measures for emergency response activities. This GAO document focuses on a rather narrow field of critical infrastructure, the US maritime energy infrastructure, which is not in the CORE’s scope. The CORE’s risk cluster might consider useful the description how the Coast Guard has applied its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) to determine risk of the US maritime energy infrastructure.

  • Port Security Grant Program, Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO, November 2011 (CORE1060)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has granted almost 1.7 billion USD to port security through the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). The program is administered by a component agency of DHS, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

    This GAO reports highlights some problems that the grant program has encountered. The first issue is that the risk assessment the FEMA uses to assess risk levels and assign grants to different ports does not take into account how security improvements affect the vulnerability of the ports to terrorist attacks. The report recommends the FEMA to design a vulnerability index that accounts for security improvement and to coordinate with the Coast Guard to get access to the most accurate vulnerability and threat information. The second issue with the grant program is that much of the grant money does not get used and translate into practical port security projects.

    The GAO report proposes acceleration of the grant granting process with updated administrative procedures and with more administrative staff. Finally, this GAO report recommends the FEMA to develop performance metrics to assess its administration in relation to the Port Security Grant Program. The contents of this GAO report is not very relevant to CORE because no US seaports are partners in the project.

  • SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Needs to Enhance Its Guidance and Oversight of High- Risk Maritime Cargo Shipments, GAO, January 2015 (CORE1059)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    The report reviews the US Customs and Border Protection’s (CPB) approach to risk assessment and targeting of maritime shipping containers.

    The report highlights that CPB does not have clear decision rules and reporting procedures to monitor percentage of containers that the risk assessment system flags high-risk and that get eventually examined. The source of this problem is that the CPB’s officials (targeters) may waive examination of the high-risk containers if the container (i) falls within a predetermined category (standard exception), or (ii) the targeters can articulate why the shipment should not be considered high risk. The targeting units have currently differing definitions of “standard exceptions” and differing views on what constitutes the “articulate reasons.”

    The GAO report recommends the CPB to clarify, harmonize and enforce the rules and the procedures for waiving the high-risk containers from examination. As for CORE, this report provides a detailed and recent outlook on the US maritime risk assessment and targeting scheme, and this information is going to support work of the CORE’s risk cluster and the demonstrations that involve shipping of sea containers into the US

  • Transportation Security Information Sharing - Stakeholder Satisfaction Varies; TSA Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Efforts, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1020)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    This report presents and discusses findings of a survey on stakeholders’ satisfaction to the US Transportation Security Administration’s security related activities and to the way the TSA disseminates information about its activities.

    The survey’s scope is the overall US transportation system, covering aviation, rail, and highway modalities and transport of passengers and freight. Given the broad scope and the US-centricity of the survey, this report is not very relevant for CORE. The education and training cluster could anyhow learn how security-related user satisfaction surveys are done and how to establish a mechanism for collecting regular user feedback.

  • MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges with Selected Port Security Programs, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1019)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    The report provides a comprehensive review of progress and challenges of various port security activities and programs the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) has carried out since 9/11.

    In essence, the report is a summary and an update of a number of more detailed GAO reports on maritime supply chain security. The report states that needs to strengthen further its efforts on maritime domain awareness through intensified communication among maritime stakeholders. Regarding the US domestic port security, the report recommends DHS to reassess its Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) that allows ports to request funds for security projects and to improve quality of vulnerability assessment in US ports. The report also urges DHS to overcome challenges of risk-based targeting and scanning of US-bound shipping containers.

    The findings and recommendations of this report help CORE consortium understand the current state of the US maritime security regime. This understanding benefits particularly the demonstrations of WP9 and WP14. Also educational and training as well as risk clusters of CORE may find the report’s information useful.

  • MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the Maritime Borders, GAO, November 2013 (CORE1018)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO report explains how the US government agencies have fought sea piracy around the Horn of Africa and at the Gulf of Guinea since 2010.

    The report also describes the current state of sea piracy threats in these two areas, and it urges US government agencies to reconsider their resource allocations, strategies and tactics related to the counterpiracy efforts. The report points out that the number of annual piracy incidents
    at the Gulf of Guinea has surpassed the yearly incidents off the Horn of Africa. This shift in pirate attacks prompt changes in the US counterpiracy operations. However, as the report points out, the US government agencies responsible for the counterpiracy activities have not
    recently conducted reassessments of their actions, despite the changing conditions.

    The report therefore recommends the US government agencies to re-evaluate the counterpiracy efforts, especially at the Gulf of Guinea that is becoming the most important hotspot of the international sea piracy. This GAO report provides information about modern sea piracy from which CORE’s maritime demonstrations might benefit.

  • MARITIME SECURITY – Ongoing U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts Would Benefit From Agency Assessments, GAO, June 2014 (CORE1017)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO report explains how the US government agencies have fought sea piracy around the Horn of Africa and at the Gulf of Guinea since 2010.

    The report also describes the current state of sea piracy threats in these two areas, and it urges US government agencies to reconsider their resource allocations, strategies and tactics related to the counterpiracy efforts. The report points out that the number of annual piracy incidents
    at the Gulf of Guinea has surpassed the yearly incidents off the Horn of Africa. This shift in pirate attacks prompt changes in the US counterpiracy operations. However, as the report points out, the US government agencies responsible for the counterpiracy activities have not
    recently conducted reassessments of their actions, despite the changing conditions.

    The report therefore recommends the US government agencies to re-evaluate the counterpiracy efforts, especially at the Gulf of Guinea that is becoming the most important hotspot of the international sea piracy. This GAO report provides information about modern sea piracy from which CORE’s maritime demonstrations might benefit.

  • CASSANDRA compendium. Standards in supply chain management (Ch. 9)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    Chapter 9 of the CASSANDRA compendium lists and discusses various standards that set the context for international supply chain management. The chapter focuses especially on management standards (e.g., ISO28000), technical standards (e.g., RFID, electronic seals and barcodes), standards for exchange of information among supply chain stakeholders (e.g., UN/EDIFACT and XML messaging), and customs security standards (especially the World Customs Organisations’ SAFE Framework of Standards). GS1 Global Visibility Framework and other industry standards are included in the discussion, as well. The chapter points out that because a large variety of standards are already available, the challenge is not a lack of standardisation but the lack of harmonisation between different standards. The section also concludes that even if the diversity of standards was harmonised, the next step would be to ensure that the standards would be consistently implemented in different contexts.

  • CASSANDRA compendium. Technologies for supply chain visibility and security (Ch. 8)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    Chapter 8 of the CASSANDRA compendium reviews current and future technologies that help managers to improve visibility and security over global end-to-end supply chains. The supply chain visibility technologies, in essence, provide logistics managers with a variety of information - shipment data, performance metrics, inventory levels, production / delivery schedules and sales forecast, for example - in or close to real time. The chapter’s review on supply chain security technologies focus mainly on security sensors (e.g., motion detectors), container seals, biometric user authentication devices (e.g., fingerprints), and non-intrusive inspection equipment (e.g., X-ray screening stations). The section also elaborates modern ways for sharing information among stakeholders that are concerned about security of the supply chain.

  • CASSANDRA compendium. Private sector perspectives on risk management (Ch. 5) and crime prevention and security management in supply chains (Ch. 6)

    08 June 2016

    Summary:

    Chapters 5 & 6 of the CASSANDRA compendium provide a general overview on supply chain security risk management from the private sector perspective. Explaining the essentials of supply chain risk management, Chapter 5 introduces commonly used risk management models and tools (e.g., risk matrices and risk registers), discusses various classifications of supply chain risks, and elaborates current trends of risks and risk management in the supply chain context. Chapter 6 focuses on specific challenges of supply chain security risks - the risks that arise from intentional, man-made criminal activities such as terrorism, theft, trafficking, and sabotage. The chapter explains a few early classifications of supply chain security risks (e.g., motive-based typology and taxonomies based on private sector perspectives). Following the classifications of security risks, the chapter puts forth a few models for managing security risks in the supply chain context (e.g., the 8-layer model for supply chain security management). The chapter concludes with a detailed case study on security management of an international security company and a comparison of supply chain security management and the total quality management (TQM) management philosophy.

  • Review of IATA E-Freight - an air cargo industry initiative facilitated by IATA, to remove paper from the supply chain (CORE1044)

    27 April 2016

    Summary:

    Launched by IATA in 2006 as part of the StB program, E-Freight became an industry-wide initiative involving carriers, freight forwarders, ground handlers, shippers and customs authorities. The roadmap to 100% E-Freight outlines a shared end-to-end industry approach with clear leadership roles, around three core components, or "pillars":

    • Pillar I: Engaging regulators and governments worldwide to create an ‘e-freight route network’ with fully electronic customs procedures and where regulations support paperless shipments.
    • Pillar II: Working collaboratively within the cargo supply chain to digitize the core industry transport documents, starting with the air waybill.
    • Pillar III: Developing a plan to digitize the commercial and special cargo documents typically accompanying airfreight today, in or outside of the ‘Cargo pouch’ 2014 targets.

    Year 2014 target was to grow global e-AWB penetration to 22%.

  • Review of TRANSPark truck parking service (CORE1041)

    27 April 2016

    Summary:

    As a response to the increasing security concerns surrounding goods transport by road, the IRU Membership has been providing information on safe and secure truck parking areas to road hauliers and truck drivers for more than two decades. Since the early 1990s, this information was disseminated in the form of a printed handbook. In 2007 the online website was launched.

    In 2013 a smartphone app was launched. Currently initiatives are taken to encourage the use of TRANSPark globally. It does not have much documentation available, except promotional fliers and the website and the app themselves.

    Available to the General Public at: http://www.iru.org/transpark-app and through the Android and iPhone TRANSPark app, which can be downloaded from the stores.

    Overall relevance to CORE is high, as truck transports constantly risk being attacked by organised crime with the aim to either steal fuel, cargo or potentially even to use a truck for terrorist purposes. Therefore, ensuring that trucks are parked at safe and
    secure truck parking areas is essential for drivers, road hauliers, shippers and other stakeholders involved in supply chain security.

  • Review of TAPA TACSS – Air Cargo Security Standards, 2012 (CORE1045)

    27 April 2016

    Summary:

    TAPA TACSS - Air Cargo Security Standards (TACSS) is a certifiable security program for the air cargo industry to close down, as much as possible, all risks for high value freight whilst being handled and transported on the ground. Available to General Public at the TAPA Website, this standard is hyperlinked here: https://www.tapaemea.com

  • Review of Cargo 2000, C2K – an IATA interest group with the mission of creating and implementing quality standards for the worldwide air cargo industry, 2015 (CORE1043)

    27 April 2016

    Summary:

    Cargo 2000 is the quality standard for the tracking, measuring general air cargo shipments. It is a project commenced in 1997 and is supported by a self-funded group of the world’s leading Airlines, Forwarders, Ground Handling Agents and specialist IT providers. IATA then provides oversight, administration and facilitation on behalf of the Membership. Cargo 2000 (C2K) uses standard recognized IATA Cargo-IMP (Interline Message Procedures) already used within the air cargo industry to provide reference points for measurement. These are known as FSU (Freight Status Update) messages. The key metrics under C2K are NFD (Notified for Delivery), in which case the destination has received both the physical cargo shipment and the information (paper or electronic) is available for collection by the Agent of the Consignee, and FAP, Flown as planned. In this case, the service delivered matches that which was promised to the customer in terms of timings and flights. In order to simplify and standardize the various processes that support C2K, as it is used by multiple stakeholders in a live environment, the C2K Master Operating Plan (MOP) was completely revised in 2012. The result is a very visual process description that allows every stakeholder to clearly see the part they play in the overall end-to-end routing of the shipment. The visual nature of the schematics, also allows the assessment of any new legislation, processes or procedures to be predicted both up and down the chain.

  • Review of the TIR Convention and its accompanying Security and Risk Management electronic tools, 2013 (CORE1040)

    27 April 2016

    Summary:

    The Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention, 1975) constitutes the international legal framework for the TIR system. TIR is the only universal Customs transit system, today operational in 58 countries, that allows the goods to transit from a country of origin to a country of destination in sealed load compartments with Customs control recognition along the supply chain. This minimizes administrative and financial burdens, while Customs duties and taxes that may become due are covered by an international guarantee (covering more than USD 1 billion worth of international trade every day). In order to ensure the security of the TIR System, electronic controls run in parallel with the security elements already specified in the TIR Convention.

  • Draft SADC guidelines for Coordinated Border Management: A Practical Guide on Best Practices and Tools for Implementation, 2011 (CORE1115)

    24 April 2016

    Summary:

    The 15 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are looking ways to ease the transition of their regional Free Trade Area towards a more integrated Customs Union where people and cargo would cross borders without excessive delays and administrative burden. The countries expect that the smoother cross-border traffic would contribute to the economic growth in the region. Central to the integration effort is coordinated border management, i.e., closer collaboration among various border control agencies, both nationally and internationally. The SADC guidelines provides a comprehensive catalogue and description of best practices of border agency cooperation and guidance how to implement them in the Southern-African context. Besides the guidelines, the document also features a comprehensive glossary of coordinated border management vocabulary.

  • Better Management of EU Borders through Cooperation (CORE1114)

    22 April 2016

    Summary:

    This report by the Center for the Study of Democracy investigates existing forms of cooperation between Border Guards and customs administrations in the European Union. The study highlights obstacles to cooperation and proposes solutions and best practices for overcoming them. The study finds that despite the common policy interest on border agency cooperation and the associated pan-European standardisation efforts, the individual Member states decide the extent and forms of customs-border guard co-operation on their own. As a result, the current state of border agency collaboration and potential for improvements differ substantially between the member states. The main differences arise from the institutional set-up (e.g., number and roles of border control agencies), powers and competencies of the border control agencies, and the legislative basis (especially legal differences in terms of privacy, data protection and confidentiality of trade information).

  • Governmental actors in supply chains & Governmental procedures, compliance and risk management – CASSANDRA Compendium Chapters 4 & 7, 2012 (CORE2007c)

    22 April 2016

    Summary:

    The fourth and seventh chapters of the CASSANDRA compendium elaborate on the roles of government agencies in international logistics and supply chain security (SCS). A broad range of government actors - customs, police agencies, border guards and many others - play a crucial role in enforcing and facilitating cross-border traffic through the global supply chains. These government agencies are critical stakeholders to be involved in the development, design and implementation of the two central CASSANRA concepts: the end-to-end data pipeline and the risk-based approach to cargo inspections and company audits. The CASSANDRA compendium highlights that there are important differences in the national laws and regulations, even within the European Union, that complicate international government collaboration. The differences in the legal framework and organisational cultures must be taken into account when designing new SCS solutions in the CASSANDRA and other projects.

  • A Decade of GAO’s Supply Chain Security Oversight, 2015 (CORE1113)

    22 April 2016

    Summary:

    The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent government watchdog organization that has been publishing many reports on the US government’s supply chain security initiatives over the past ten years. This article reviews 25 most relevant GAO’s reports that discuss strengths, weaknesses and future challenges of the US policies and regulations on supply chain security. The review findings reveal interesting facts about similarities and differences of the US and the EU approaches to supply chain security. This comparison opens new venues for further Transatlantic benchmarking as well as harmonisation and mutual recognition of supply chain security programs. This review was conducted as part of European FP7-Project CORE.

  • Supply Chain Security: Survey on Law Enforcement Agencies’ Training Needs, 2015 (CORE1112)

    22 April 2016

    Summary:

    In a recent study, a joint CBRA-INTERPOL research team investigates what kind of training material would help law enforcement agencies to fight crime in the context of global supply chains. The team conducted a pilot survey at the LE TrainNet Meeting (Networking Meeting of the Law Enforcement training institutions) which took place in Baku, Azerbaijan, 28- 29 April 2015. Findings of the pilot survey will be used to launch a large EU-wide survey on law enforcement agencies’ training needs regarding supply chain security. The survey findings also guide production of new training and educational material that the FP7 CORE is currently producing.

  • Collaborative Border Management in Thailand and Neighbouring Countries: Needs, Challenges and Issues, June 2013 (CORE2014)

    30 March 2016

    Summary:

    Thailand is interested in coordinated border management conceptualization and implementation like many other countries. There are, however, some special challenges that Thailand faces when the country tries to strengthen cooperation with its neighbouring countries. 

  • Transit electronic platform in Central America, December 2010 (CORE2013a and 2013b)

    30 March 2016

    Summary:

    The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reports that more than 95% of commercial goods in the Mesoamerican region are transported overland using the Pacific Corridor. This traffic represents approximately 6 billion USD worth of goods on a highway which runs from Puebla, Mexico to Panama and crosses six national borders. The problem with the Pacific Corridor is with unreliable, inefficient and substandard infrastructure. In 2008, to upgrade the inadequate infrastructure, the IDB launched a ambitious project called International Goods in Transit. According to the report, the results of the project were outstanding: average time to cross a border was reduced from 62 minutes to eight. The project also succeeded to reduce the number of documents that traders needed to submit to border control agencies. 

  • Integrated Border Management Strategy in Croatia, April 2005 (CORE2012)

    30 March 2016

    Summary:

    An Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy was written in Croatia in accordance with the guidelines of the European Union and in collaboration with international experts. This strategy and its implementation action plan was adopted by the Croatian government on the 21 April 2005.

  • Cooperation experiences of the Canada Border Services Agency, July 2012 (CORE2011)

    30 March 2016

    Summary:

    The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has a dual mandate (1) to facilitate cross-border movements of cargo and people and (2) to protect security and safety of the Canadian people. The agency seeks to provide integrated border services, by closely cooperating with other Canadian border control agencies as well as with foreign customs administrations. 

  • Collaborative Border Management in Thailand and Neighbouring Countries: Needs, Challenges and Issues, June 2013 (CORE2014)

    30 March 2016

    Summary:

    Thailand is interested in coordinated border management conceptualization and implementation like many other countries. There are, however, some special challenges that Thailand faces when the country tries to strengthen cooperation with its neighbouring countries.

  • Transit electronic platform in Central America, December 2010 (CORE2013a and 2013b)

    30 March 2016

    Summary:

    The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reports that more than 95% of commercial goods in the Mesoamerican region are transported overland using the Pacific Corridor. This traffic represents approximately 6 billion USD worth of goods on a highway which runs from Puebla, Mexico to Panama and crosses six national borders. The problem with the Pacific Corridor is with unreliable, inefficient and substandard infrastructure. In 2008, to upgrade the inadequate infrastructure, the IDB launched a ambitious project called International Goods in Transit. According to the report, the results of the project were outstanding: average time to cross a border was reduced from 62 minutes to eight. The project also succeeded to reduce the number of documents that traders needed to submit to border control agencies. 

  • Integrated Border Management Strategy in Croatia, April 2005 (CORE2012)

    30 March 2016

    Summary:

    An Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy was written in Croatia in accordance with the guidelines of the European Union and in collaboration with international experts. This strategy and its implementation action plan was adopted by the Croatian government on the 21 April 2005.

  • SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO, September 2013 (CORE1007)

    12 March 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO report reviews maritime supply chain security programs that the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies – mainly the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard – have implemented since 2001. The report examines (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed risk levels of foreign ports and allocated security resources accordingly and (2) activities DHS has taken to monitor and improve efficiency and effectiveness of its security initiatives. Drawing on numerous interviews of key stakeholders and examination of key documents, the report recommends CBP to consider expansion of its Container Security Initiative (CSI) into new ports based on a periodic risk assessment of foreign ports. The report also highlights opportunities for further harmonization of the US maritime security initiatives with their foreign counterparts through mutual recognition agreements. Since this report contains fundamental information about the US maritime security programs, many CORE work packages are likely to benefit from the insights this report provides. Especially, the demonstrations, which involve ocean shipping, as well as the risk cluster, can use this information to support and guide their work.

  • SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning, GAO, February 2012 (CORE1005)

    12 March 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO document analyses the progress and challenges of the US maritime supply chain security initiatives. The document puts a special emphasis on (1) the advance cargo information (ACI) schemes that enable the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to assess risk levels of US-bound cargo containers, (2) technologies to track, monitor and screen the shipping containers for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other contraband, and (3) to evaluate the progress towards the 100-percent scanning of the US-bound containerized cargo. As the overarching theme, the report addresses the current state of the partnerships the component agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have been fostering with the private sector and foreign governments. Besides the demonstrations, which deal with the US-related maritime logistics, the CORE’s risk and educational clusters can benefit from the insight and information this report offers.

  • TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION – Progress and Challenges Faced in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs, GAO, March 2012 (CORE1004)

    12 March 2016

    Summary:

    The report discusses status and future challenges of the Transportation Security Administration’s three key security programs: The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. The two earlier programs are related to the passenger security, which not in the scope of the CORE project. The third TWIC program – an initiative for vetting backgrounds of maritime workers that require access to regulated maritime facilities and vessels – is the only program on supply chain security. The report recommends that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would improve its internal procedures (e.g., enrolment practices, background checking and quality control) and define and measure performance criteria for assessing the TWIC program’s efficiency and effectiveness. This GAO report discusses mainly passenger security programs that are not interesting for the CORE and for most of the project partners. However, learning about the TWIC program might be useful for at least those CORE demonstrations on maritime supply chain security.

  • Annexes to the COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION concerning the adoption of annual work programmes for 2015 for the Customs 2020 and Fiscalis 2020 programmes and the financing for the implementation of those Programmes, 13.2.2015 (CORE1002)

    12 March 2016

    Summary:

    This document contains two annexes. Annex 1 covers the Customs 2020 Work Programme for 2015. It describes the activities and the budget breakdown for the year 2015 for pursuing the objectives laid down in Regulation 1294/2013 that establishes an action programme for customs in the European Union between 2014 and 2020. Annex 2 covers Fiscalis 2020 Work Programme for 2015. It covers the action plans and the budget breakdown for 2015 in relation to Regulation 1286/2013 establishing an action programme to improve the operation of taxation systems in the European Union for the period 2014-2020. The activities and financial coverage are based on three main items-action grants, procurement and other actions.

  • COSO. Enterprise Risk Management — Integrated Framework – Executive Summary. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. September 2004. (CORE1106)

    06 March 2016

    Summary:

    The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, COSO, defines Enterprise Risk Management, ERM, as a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives. The entity objectives are set forth in following four categories: (i) Strategic – high-level goals, aligned with and supporting its mission; (ii) Operations – effective and efficient use of its resources; (iii) Reporting – reliability of reporting; and (iv) Compliance – compliance with applicable laws and regulations. According to COSO, ERM enables management to effectively deal with uncertainty and associated risk and opportunity, enhancing the capacity to build value. Within the context of FP7-CORE project – and, supply chain security management in general – ERM can be seen as a useful approach particularly when it comes to aligning security risk appetite and strategy; to enhancing security risk response decisions; and to reducing security related operational surprises and losses. Some other ERM aspects such as seizing opportunities (“positive risks”) may not apply in supply chain security management context. One more interesting note, which could also be applied for supply chain security: everyone in an entity has some responsibility for ERM.

  • C-TPAT Program Benefits Reference Guide, 2014 (CORE1032)

    06 March 2016

    Summary:

    This guidebook outlines the key elements and benefits of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program that is designed to secure global supply chains and to improve United States border security.

  • C-TPAT Best Practices Catalog Addendum, 2009 (CORE1031)

    06 March 2016

    Summary:

    This addendum document lists cargo security best practices with focus on prevention of weapons of mass effect, terrorists, and/or contraband from infiltrating into the international supply chain. Each best practice is linked to a specific business entity, such as a Manufacturing Company, a Highway Carrier, an Importer or a Foreign Consolidator but these may apply to other business types as well.

  • CEN Supply Chain Security — Good Practice Guide for Small and Medium Sized Operators, 2012 (CORE1030)

    05 March 2016

    Summary:

    This is a guidance document for small and medium sized enterprises, SMEs. on how to apply a supply chain security approach to their operations in order to mitigate the risk of criminal activities. It gives an overview of the main crime types occurring in the supply chain along with some countermeasures, as well as the supply chain security initiatives, and the compliance requirements thereof.

  • SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices, GAO, April 2008 (CORE1011)

    23 February 2016

    Summary:

    The GAO report discusses the progress the Customs and Border Protection (CPB), a component agency of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made since 2015 with its flagship business-private supply chain security program Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The report focuses on three main areas of the C-TPAT’s management and governance: (1) awarding benefits for the C-TPAT compliant companies, (2) validating the member companies’ security compliance and (3) addressing CBP’s staffing challenges that the increasing popularity of the C-TPAT program brings. The report recommends CPB to improve its C-TPAT validation processes and instruments and to establish performance criteria for assessing the program’s impact on supply chain security and trade facilitation. The C-TPAT program and this GAO report contain useful information for the CORE’s demonstrations that import goods into the US. Also the CORE’s risk cluster can learn about opportunities and challenges a voluntary, risk-based supply chain security entails.

  • SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – Examinations of High- Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed, GAO, January 2008 (CORE1010)

    23 February 2016

    Summary:

    This report reviews the progress that the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) – a program for screening US-bound high-risk shipping containers in foreign ports with X-ray and radiation detection solutions – since the latest 2005 GAO review. The report discusses how the CBP’s CSI efforts have (1) contributed to the long-term, strategic planning on the US supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI activities worldwide and (3) established means to evaluate performance of the CSI activities. The report recommends CBP to develop its data collection practices that are related to the CSI team performance and the host government’s inspections of the US-bound containers. This report provides relevant information for CORE demonstrations that deal with US-bound maritime logistics and commerce. Also the risk cluster might benefit from the descriptions of the US risk-based supply chain security scheme – Automated Targeting System (AST), 24-hour rule and the importer security filing 10+2 – that the report elaborates in detail.

  • SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain, GAO, August 2008 (CORE1009)

    23 February 2016

    Summary:

    This report discusses how the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has (1) contributed to international supply chain security standards and (2) promoted mutual recognition in the customs security area and (3) how the agency expects to implement the 100% scanning requirement of the containerized US-bound maritime cargo. The report provides a detailed outlook on the US customs supply chain security scheme, and it highlights challenges and problems that the US government faces in promoting its supply chain security strategy internationally. The development and the implementation of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards, a suite of best practices on customs security, is a central theme throughout this GAO report. Because of its broad scope, the customs-related supply chain security, this document contains information that is likely to be useful for all CORE work packages, and especially for those that involve customs administrations.

  • AVIATION SECURITY – Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO, April 2007 (CORE1008)

    23 February 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO reports reviews the current state and future challenges of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) and the Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) efforts for enhanced security of foreign origin US-bound air cargo. The report also discusses how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has reached out to the air cargo industry and foreign authorities in order to strengthen the international air cargo security. The GAO report recommends that the DHS would establish a risk-based air cargo security strategy, improve interagency communication nationally, to step up compliance monitoring for the air cargo industry’s stakeholders and to assess the foreign authorities’ intent and capabilities to meet US expectations on the air cargo security that is the foundation for mutual recognition and international harmonization of regulatory frameworks on the air cargo security. This GAO report is going to be useful for the CORE risk and education cluster as well as for all the demonstrations that involve shipping of air cargo by air.

  • MARITIME SECURITY – DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy, GAO, October 2013 (CORE1016)

    08 February 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO report reviews current activities the Department of Homeland Security, its component agencies and its stakeholders are doing to protect the US-centric seaborne trade and logistics from threats arising from small vessels. The report argues that the small vessels pose two “great threats” to the US maritime system: (1) explosive-laden small vessels can be used to ram into maritime structures or (2) the small vessels can be used as vehicles for transporting tools, weapons and tools for terrorism into the US. The GAO report highlights that DHS has its Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS), but the organization is not monitoring the progress its component agencies are doing in meeting its objectives. This report focuses mainly on security initiatives that affect navigation of small vessels at the US territorial waters and ports and operations of the US coastal guards and customs. Although US-based maritime logistics operations benefit from the increased security the small vessel security initiatives likely bring, they can continue their business as usual. Therefore, the CORE’s early work packages can use this report’s information to define the context of the global supply chain security, the CORE demonstrations do not need much attention to the small vessel security initiatives or this GAO report.

  • TRANSPORTATION SECURITY – Action Needed to Strengthen TSA’s Security Threat Assessment Process, GAO, 2013 (CORE1015)

    08 February 2016

    Summary:

    The GAO report is about measuring the performance of the Adjudication Centre that is a department within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsible for administering background checks for people who need access to secure facilities unescorted. The centre issues the access credentials based on a through vetting of the applicant’s criminal history, immigration status, and connections to terrorist groups, among other checks. The report argues that the Adjunction Centre could improve the efficiency of the background checks – the individual security threat assessment – by improving its performance measurement system through better data and indicators. Although this GAO report focuses on a rather narrow topic, management of the background checking process, the report’s insights could benefit the CORE’s risk management cluster and those demonstrations that deal with access control matters.

  • SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System, GAO, October 2012 (CORE1014)

    08 February 2016

    Summary:

    The US maritime security strategy uses advance cargo information to assess risk levels of US-bound maritime shipping containers. This GAO report reviews how the Automated Targeting System, a web-based computer program that calculates risk scores for the containers, support the US Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) targeting efforts. The report argues that CBP could improve its targeting program by establishing sound procedures and criteria for assessing the performance of the targeting activity. This GAO report contains information about the US risk-based shipment targeting solution that benefit the CORE’s risk and IT clusters. The US-related demonstrations may also find the report’s information useful.

  • MARITIME SECURITY – Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO, September 2012 (CORE1013)

    08 February 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO report reviews how the US government has advanced maritime security since the introduction of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in 2002 and what kind of challenges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies have encountered in translating the Act’s requirements into practice. The report describes in detail the character, progress and future vision of main US maritime security programs, which, according to the report, fall into four domains: (1) security planning, (2) port and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and information exchange and (4) international supply chain security. The report points out that the US maritime security scheme calls for further improvements in the areas of (1) program management and implementation, (2) partnerships and collaboration, (3) resources, funding, and sustainability as well as (4) performance measures.  This report describes the entire field of US maritime security, and this information is very useful for CORE demonstrations that involve shipping into, through or out of the US ports.

  • Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration 2015 (CORE2010)

    05 February 2016

    Summary:

    This document sets a vision of the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the primary border control agency present at the US borders, for year 2020. The vision builds on four general goals and associated objectives that aim to improve safety, security and prosperity of the American people. Collaboration, risk management as well as exchange and exploitation of information and intelligence are in the heart of the vision document and integral elements of its goals and objectives.

  • Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions. Barka, H., B., 2012 (CORE2009)

    05 February 2016

    Summary:

    Pan-African economic integration has progressed over past years, producing a broad range of regional trade agreements and economic communities that seek to harmonise policies, develop common infrastructure and remove barriers to intra-African trade. Against expectations, however, this increased integration has not translated into strong economic growth in Africa. This article discusses how sub-Saharan countries can overcome trade barriers that undermine the African economic integration. The article’s focus is on border posts and customs procedures that play a key role in facilitating cross-border traffic.

    According to the article, the problems of international trade in Africa are largely explained by inadequate infrastructure that creates congestion and limits connectivity, delays that stem from complex and manual customs procedures, corruption and by illicit trade. One-stop-border-posts are a promising approach to streamline customs procedures and curb corruption. The joint border post may bring trade facilitation benefits as significant as costly investments on roads, ports, bridges and other transport infrastructure. The articles highlights the Chirundu One-Stop Border Post between Zambia and Zimbabwe as a successful case of border agency cooperation. Previous Observatory review (CORE2008, 20 January 2016) describes the Chirundu border crossing in more detail.

    The paper concludes by suggesting One-Stop-Border-Post as a promising way towards higher trade facilitation and African integration. To organise one-stop-border-post, the first thing to do is to analyse roles and procedures of different border control agencies. The task of high-level governance is to define how responsibilities across the various border control agencies are harmonised, coordinated and delegated. Metrics and statistics should underpin the design, as numerical data into traffic flows and clearance times are likely to reveal the major bottlenecks in the cross-border traffic. Finally, the article proposes extended exchange of information and data across government agencies, domestically and internationally.

  • COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 889/2014 of 14 August 2014 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93

    26 January 2016

    Summary:

    COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 889/2014 of 14 August 2014 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, as regards recognition of the common security requirements under the regulated agent and known consignor programme and the Authorised Economic Operator programme, 2014 (CORE1069)

    Existing customs Regulation ((EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code) and aviation legislation (Regulation (EC) No 300/2008) provides for certain recognition of the certifications under the respective programmes, in particular with regard to the security examinations done for each of them. Regulation (EU) No 889/2014 is necessary for the recognition of the known consignor status with its relevance for the AEO as well, frame the scope of recognition of the common requirements between the respective programmes and allow for the necessary exchange of information between customs and aviation authorities.

  • Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended, GAO, 2010 (CORE1068)

    21 January 2016

    Summary:

    This report reviews container security technologies that the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has evaluated and tested between 2004 and 2009. These container security technologies aim to (1) detect and report unauthorized intrusions into the shipping containers and (2) to track the movement of the containers through the supply chain. As of 2009, DHS has funded and tested four different container security technologies. So far, none of the candidate technologies meet all desired functional requirements: main problems are high false alarm rates, low detection probability, and difficult installation and calibration. Besides the unsatisfactory test results, the report points out problems of conducting the phase II practical “trade lane” testing in the context of the maritime transport only. The report recommends to test the technologies “across all operational scenarios,” considering contextual differences across different modes of transport. Once the technologies would pass this extended trade lane testing, the DHS should (1) obtain support from the trade industry and international partners, (2) develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for using the technology, and (3) certify the container security technologies for use.

  • AVIATION SECURITY – Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains, GAO 2008 (CORE1067)

    21 January 2016

    Summary:

    This GAO report discusses the impact of the 26 billion USD that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent on aviation security since 2004. The report focuses especially on the current status and the future challenges of passenger screening, air cargo security and passenger watch-list matching program known as Secure Flight. The air cargo security discussion is the report’s most relevant section from the CORE’s viewpoint. The information in the report, that has been published as early as July 2008, is anyhow largely outdated: it discusses challenges that TSA and the air cargo community need to overcome before starting the 100% screening of air cargo that flies on board passenger planes, a legal requirement that become into force in August 2010 and that was set by the Implementing Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (aka the 9/11 Act). The report also recommended strengthening the security of US-bound foreign air cargo (into the US from the rest of the world), to bring it on a par with outbound air cargo security (from the US to rest of the world). More recent regulations and initiatives have corrected this weakness in the US air cargo security: today, third country air carriers must screen cargo up to US standards (or national standards if the country of origin and the US recognize each other’s air cargo regimes) before loading cargo on US-bound planes.

  • SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, GAO (October 2009, CORE1066)

    21 January 2016

    Summary:

    The document provides a comprehensive outlook on the past and recent US initiatives on container security. The report focuses on the challenges that prevent global implementation of the 100% scanning of US-bound containers in foreign ports with both non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies and radiation detection devices, as mandated by the SAFE Port Act and the 9/11 Acts. The 100% scanning is believed to deter and detect terrorist attempts of smuggling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States inside a cargo container. The reports dates back to late 2009, so the description of the current state of the US container security it provides is not necessarily no longer accurate. The report anticipates that the implementation of the 100% scanning requirement will be delayed due to various problems that were identified during the precursory Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilots. These problems are related mainly to port logistics (routing of containers through scanning sites), employee safety (radiation of screening equipment) and technical constraints (equipment failures and poor quality of scanning images). Today, we know that the US authorities have deferred the implementation already twice, first to 2014 and for the second time until 2016. Altogether, this GAO report describes in detail the challenges of the 100% scanning law and elaborates some ongoing alternative risk-based approaches to container security: (1) the strategic trade lane strategy that aims to establish 100% scanning only in high terrorist risk foreign sea ports and (2) the “10 + 2” data requirements that importers and ocean carriers must submit to the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) prior to a container is loaded aboard a US-bound vessel so that the US authorities can calculate more precise risk for each shipping container. This report includes relevant information for all the CORE’s demonstrations that involve US-bound maritime transportation.

  • Zambia and Zimbabwe’s single-stop solution to boosting intra-African trade, The Guardian 2012 (CORE2008)

    20 January 2016

    Summary:

    The Guardian news article summarizes benefits and challenges of the African first one-stop border post, located at the Chirundu border crossing across the Zambezi river between Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the border post, officials in both countries inspect only inbound traffic, for example Zambian authorities control only incoming traffic from Zimbabwe. Thanks to this one-stop arrangement, trucks and barges are obliged to stop only once and undergo only one set of border formalities. The one-stop system has accelerated border crossing times tremendously, from a two or three day wait down to a thirty-minute rest. Moreover, the faster border formalities have translated into higher traffic at the border post (from earlier 2000 to today’s 14000 trucks per month) and associated larger tax and duty revenues. But most importantly, the faster and simpler border formalities have facilitated trade of many small-scale merchants, who commonly trade small amounts of food, clothes, and other everyday commodities. Today, these small merchants face less delays, cumbersome formalities, and arbitrary duties and facilitation payments that dishonest customs officials may impose on their goods. This progress has brought many of the informal merchants, who used to smuggle their merchandise before, back into the sphere of the formal economy. Even so, the smuggling is still a major problem in Africa: the article suggests that there are smuggling routes so established that 30 tonne trucks use them to evade customs controls, and that this informal smuggling economy accounts for a staggering one-third of the African gross domestic product (GDP). The article implies that the share of the informal economy could be further reduced through consolidation of African trade blocks (there are several), harmonization and simplification of border formalities, and enhanced border agency cooperation.

  • Review of “MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION – DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity”,

    15 January 2016

    Summary:

    Review of “MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION – DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity”, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, United States Government Accountability Office, June 2014 (CORE1098).

    Actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and two of its component agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as other federal agencies, to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment have been limited.

  • Review of Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, International Maritime Organization (CORE1097)

    15 January 2016

    Summary:

    The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code sets new standards for security for ships at sea as well as port facilities around the world. It aims to make shipping activities more secure against threats of terrorism, piracy and smuggling. Security at sea has been a concern to governments, shipping lines, port authorities and importers and exporters for years. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, provided the catalyst for formalizing tough new security measures. In December of 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) organized a conference to discuss issues related to security at sea. At this conference, representatives from 150 nations (the Contracting Governments) participated in drafting amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, and the ISPS Code was adopted. Changes to the SOLAS Convention include amendments to Chapters V and XI, and Chapter XI was divided into Chapters XI-1 and XI-2. The new Chapter XI-2 provides the umbrella ISPS regulations. The Code itself is divided into two parts. Part A presents mandatory requirements, Part B contains guidance regarding the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the Code.

  • Review of “Contributing to shipping container security: can passive sensors bring a solution?” G. Janssens-Maenhout a, F. De Roob, W. Janssens, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 2009 (CORE1096)

    15 January 2016

    Summary:

    Illicit trafficking of fissionable material in container cargoes is recognized as a potential weakness in Nuclear Security. Triggered by the attacks of 11 September 2001, measures were undertaken to enhance maritime security in extension to the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention and in line with the US Container Security Initiatives. Effective detection techniques are needed that allow the inspector to intercept illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons components or components of other nuclear explosive devices.

  • Supply chain finances and liabilities (CASSANDRA Compendium Chapter 3 – CORE2007b)

    11 January 2016

    Summary:

    The third chapter of the CASSANDRA compendium clarifies financial and insurance concepts and techniques of international supply chain management. In cross-border trade, exporters and importers often insure themselves against a variety of risks, including loss or damage of goods in transit, currency fluctuations, and a business partner’s default. In particular, exchange of goods for money between sellers (exporters) and buyers (importers) is a great source risk and uncertainty in international logistics transactions. For example, advance payment is unfavorable for importers in terms of cost, cash-flow and risk of default. On the contrary, selling goods on consignment puts exporters at a risk. For risk mitigation, exporters commonly protect themselves against buyers that fail to pay for goods whereas importers protect themselves against exporters that fail to deliver goods. The chapter illustrates how financial transactions and conventions underpin physical flow of goods in international supply chains.

  • Introduction to Supply Chain Management (CASSANDRA Compendium Chapter 2, CORE2007a)

    11 January 2016

    Summary:

    The second chapter of the CASSANDRA compendium gives a general outlook on the theory and practice of modern supply chain management. Written in lay-man’s language, the text explains a broad range of strategies for managing supply chains, from lean management to agile and responsive logistics. The chapter also defines fundamental supply chain terminology and discusses current trends in the logistics, including synchromodality, use of 4PL logistics service providers, and green logistics. The chapter introduces several supply chain reference frameworks that illustrate a series of interdependent activities and stakeholders involved in the international transport of cargo.

  • Trade and money laundering uncontained (the Economist, May 2014, CORE2006)

    06 January 2016

    Summary:

    International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls.

  • Drug trafficking in the Caribbean – the Full circle (the Economist May 2014, CORE2005)

    06 January 2016

    Summary:

    Anti-drug officials report rising cocaine imports into the US through the Caribbean islands. The officials ascribe the increasing popularity of the Caribbean route to the strengthened enforcement of alternative trafficking routes. The South American cocaine smuggling routes have displaced several times over the years due, and now again the Caribbean route is the same one than traffickers used two decades ago. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.

    The drug traffickers move significant amounts of their cocaine from Colombian coca farms and laboratories to Venezuela by jungle trails, riverboats and small aircraft. From the Venezuelan coast, the contraband is smuggled to Caribbean islands by speedboats, planes, sometimes hidden inside commercial cargo. The cocaine traffickers use then yachts, mules, cruise ships, fast boats and commercial cargo vessels to smuggle the illegal drugs into the US and Europe. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.

  • 2015
  • Punta Cana Resolution, Resolution of the Policy Commission of the World Customs Organization on the Role of Customs in the Security Context, WCO 2015 (CORE2004)

    22 December 2015

    Summary:

    The new Punta Cana Resolution sets guidelines for customs’ security roles in the combat against the new wave of terrorism, as manifested by recent attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, France and Mali. The resolution highlights that the customs authorities are typically the first line of defense against transnational crime, terrorism and extremism: the customs control cross-border movements of people, cargo, money and modes of transport and thus protect communities against terrorists that may exploit international supply chains to move materials, funds or operatives across borders. Building on the previous WCO instruments and agreements, especially on the WCO Security Programme, the Punta Cana resolution is the customs community’s action plan and renewed pledge of solidarity that provides a diplomatic backdrop for further counterterrorism activities.

  • IT-enabled Resilient, Seamless and Secure Global Supply Chains: Introduction, Overview and Research Topics, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, by Klievink, B., Zomer, G., 2015 (CORE2003)

    22 December 2015

    Summary:

    How does IT innovation contribute towards development of secure, resilient and integrated international supply chains? This is the question that Bram and Zomer seek to address by examining research agendas of a set of past and present European supply chain projects. In their research paper, these authors identify three main areas of innovation - technology, supply chain risk concepts and collaboration and supervision concepts - that lead the way towards higher uptake of new IT technologies and services in the global supply chains. The authors argue that developers of modern IT-enabled supply chains should pay more regard on non-technical challenges that often hinder adoption of modern IT solutions. The study also introduces and discusses five research papers that will be presented at the fourth Workshop on IT-enabled Resilient, Seamless and Secure Global Supply Chains, WITNESS 2015.

  • Summary list on: Illicit activities and flows, with estimated monetary values

    09 March 2015

    Summary:

    This summary list on illicit activities and flows, with estimated monetary values, could have some relevance for CORE Risk-cluster – to understand better the consequences of the illicit acts we try to prevent – and well as for CORE WP19 Education and training. The list has been compiled by CBRA.

  • Summary list on: Big numbers in global trade and logistics

    09 March 2015

    Summary:

    This summary list on the big numbers in global trade and logistics – including estimated international trade value, total number of sea ports and airports, number of commercial ships and airplanes on the move etc. - could have some relevance for CORE Risk-cluster – to understand better the massive context of global trade and logistics we have to deal with – and well as for CORE WP19 Education and training. The list has been compiled by CBRA.

  • Review of Building Resilience in Supply Chains (CORE1055)

    01 March 2015

    Summary:

    Review on Building Resilience in Supply Chains - An Initiative of the Risk Response Network - In collaboration with Accenture - World Economic Forum. The report broadens the view of resilient supply chains away from pure trucking towards taking all available transport modes into account. Additional relevance is given by building partnerships of private companies and creating strategic transport orientation in normal times and to be executed in harsh times. The views given are from large industry and insurers point of view thus serve as hints to SMEs. Demo-WPs concerned with resilience should have the ideas in mind in order to follow the worlds to forum and on the other side identified lacks (of focus on consumers of goods) should be avoided in CORE demonstration layouts.  Coding in CORE e-library is CORE1055.

  • Review of “Trade Compliance: a Burden or an Opportunity?” (CORE1054)

    01 March 2015

    Summary:

    Review of “Trade Compliance: A Burden or an Opportunity?” This is a White Paper by DINALOG Dutch Institute for Advanced Logistics, VLM Vereining Logistiek Management. The information aims at Core Demo-WPs where the either trade compliance in general or single aspects of better cargo and data flow is to be demonstrated. This has an impact on the preceding WPs when defining rules and fixing systems. Coding CORE1054, in the CORE e-library. Available to General Public at: http://www.logistiek.nl/PageFiles/5478/010_logistiek-download-LOGNWS113052D01.pdf. Coding CORE1054, in the CORE e-library.

    The document reads about the basics of Trade Compliance relevant for worldwide economy and movement of goods across borders and shows a quantification of the value for goods exported from the Netherlands. A discussion of administrative burdens conducting international trade follows. Main issues are diversity of applicable governmental laws including ex-, import and transshipped countries, increasing internationalization of trade and the obstacles of physical of goods. Different data sets partly with identical content have to be presented to various agencies and depending on goods, extra rules do apply sometimes. The electronic data transmission contains further obstacles and varies from agency to agency and from one commercial partner to another. Even already established rules on harmonization do not avoid constant update and adoption of ERP systems of traders. When following the physical movements of goods more obstacles unveil with governmental agencies resulting in delays. Certification is already established but does not lower burdens at the moment.

  • Review of Electronic Customs Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014 REVISION (CORE1052)

    01 March 2015

    Summary:

    The Electronic Customs Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) 2014 REVISION is a management and planning tool drawn up by the European Commission in partnership with Member States in accordance with Article 8(2) of the e-Customs decision. All the CORE demonstrators are affected by the MASP. Original review files are coded as CORE1052, in the e-library of the CORE project.

  • Review “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system” [COM (2011) 144 final] (CORE1029).

    01 March 2015

    Summary:

    In this White Paper, the Commission sets out to remove major barriers and bottlenecks in many key areas across the fields of transport infrastructure and investment, innovation and the internal market. The aim is to create a Single European Transport Area with more competition and a fully integrated transport network which links the different modes and allows for a profound shift in transport patterns for passengers and freight. To this purpose, the roadmap puts forward 40 concrete initiatives for the next decade, explained in detail in the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the White Paper. It has some background relevance for CORE, as it proposes initiatives to build a competitive transport system that will preserve mobility, remove major barriers in key areas and fuel growth and employment. Original files are coded CORE1029, in the CORE e-library.

  • Review COM(2014) 527 EU Strategy and Action Plan for customs risk management (CORE1028).

    01 March 2015

    Summary:

    This Communication puts forward a strategy for improving customs risk management and supply chain security ('the Strategy') and a table of priority actions ('the Action Plan'). Original files coded CORE1028, in the CORE e-library.

  • Review COM(2012) 793 Customs Risk Management and Security of the Supply Chain. (CORE1001)

    01 March 2015

    Summary:

    The purpose of this Communication is to: (i) review the implementation of customs risk management policy; (ii) put forward a strategic approach for the years ahead; (iii) make recommendations for action with a focus on efficient deployment of resources. Effective risk management of the movement of goods through the international supply chain is critical for security and safety and essential to facilitating legitimate trade and protecting the financial and economic interest of the EU and its Member States. There are critical challenges to be tackled and these cannot be fully resolved at Member State level but require EU action to complement and reinforce the efforts made at national level. Relevant for all of CORE, and specifically for Customs issues, e.g. WP14 Demonstrator FALACUS- FAstLAne through CUStoms. Coding in CORE e-library is CORE1001.

  • FP7-CONTAIN Report Summary (CORE3011)

    01 March 2015

    Summary:

    This review on reference project focuses on: FP7-CONTAIN project. The CONTAIN Base platform might contribute to CORE Supply Chain Situational Awareness Toolset (T4.1). The CONTAIN Dashboard is a good example towards CORE T3.3. The author of the review is Konstantinos Vasileiou, ILS. The document code is CORE3011, in the CORE e-library.

  • FP7-COMCIS Report Summary (CORE3010)

    01 March 2015

    Summary:

    This review on reference project focuses on: COMCIS (Collaborative Information Services for Container Management), which was an EU research project focusing on facilitating the development of interoperable communication channels between businesses and authorities, with the use of electronic messages and state-of-the-art communication infrastructure. An important infrastructural component of the COMCIS unified interoperability layer is the Single Point Data Interchange (SPDI) component. The author of the review is Konstantinos Vasileiou, ILS. Document coding in CORE e-library is CORE3010.

  • FP7-EUROSKY Report Summary (CORE3009a)

    01 March 2015

    Summary:

    This reference project review focuses on FP7-EUROSKY. The author of the review is Konstantinos Vasileiou, ILS. The original files are coded as CORE3009a, in the CORE e-library.

  • Review on FP7-SAFEPOST (CORE3008)

    28 February 2015

    Summary:

    This review on reference projects focuses on FP7-SAFEPOST. The author of the review is Konstantinos Vasileiou, ILS. The original files can be found in CORE e-library with coding CODE3008.

  • Review on FP7-SUPPORT project (CORE3007)

    28 February 2015

    Summary:

    This review on reference projects, specifying reusable outputs, focuses FP7-SUPPORT project. The author of the review is Konstantinos Vasileiou, ILS. The original review documents can be found in CORE e-library with the coding CORE3007.

  • FP7 EcoHubs and ecoTAURUS review (CORE3006)

    28 February 2015

    Summary:

    This review on reference projects, specifying reusable outputs, focuses on FP7-EcoHubs: Message-based Access Points and on ecoTAURUS. The aim of the EcoHubs project is to produce an infrastructure and a range of value added services which are driven by leading European intermodal terminal operators. The author of this review is Konstantinos Vasileiou, ILS. Coding for CORE e-library is CORE3006.

  • ECSIT Report Summary (CORE3005)

    28 February 2015

    Summary:

    This reference project review focuses on German national funded research project ECSIT: Enhancing container security through non-contact inspection at the seaport terminal. The work done in ECSIT in non-intrusive inspection devices should be continued and refined in CORE ST2.3 Next Generation Scanning System. Furthermore the ECSIT AP7 Demonstration of the system might be used as a good working example for organization and operating plans towards the CORE ST 2.3.4 Field Demonstration. More support from ECSIT might be given to CORE T7.3 Scenario-based simulation and towards US-based Demo WPs for the broadly discussed and approved scenarios how to survey container with a multi-layered inspection approach in mind. The authors of the review are Marcus Engler and Matthias Dreyer, ISL. You can find the full review and original files in CORE e-library, with the coding CORE3005.

  • FP7-project RISING (CORE3004)

    28 February 2015

    Summary:

    RISING is a project co-financed by the European Commission (DG MOVE) within the 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. RISING has the overall objective of identifying, integrating and further developing information services such as River Information Services (RIS) in order to efficiently support Inland Waterway Transport (IWT) and logistics operations. This review of reference projects and specification of reusable outputs has been authored by Marcus Engler and Arne Gehlhaar of ISL. Original review and source files can be found in CORE e-library with coding CORE3004.

  • FP7-project e-Freight Report Summary (CORE3003a)

    28 February 2015

    Summary:

    This document is about CORE review of reference projects and specification of reusable outputs, on FP7-project e-Freight. Authors are Marcus Engler and Oliver Klein, both from ISL. The original files can be found in CORE e-library, with coding CORE3003a.

  • Review on FP7-project IMCOSEC (CORE3001)

    28 February 2015

    Summary:

    This is review on reference projects / specifying reusable outputs, on FP7-project IMCOSEC. The research in IMCOSEC (Integrated approach to improve the supply chain for container transport and integrated security simultaneously) was on following two conflicting trends in years before the project started: the elimination of trade barriers to ensure free trade, and increasing security demands to counter the threat of terrorism mainly. The author of the review is Marcus Engler, ISL. The original document can be found in CORE e-library coded as CORE3001.

  • Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots (Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE) Act of 2006, Section 231), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CORE1039)

    18 February 2015

    Summary:

    The document reports the pilot of an integrated scanning system at three foreign ports during the six month pilot period beginning in October of 2007, which were directed by the US Congress to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), as necessary, and the private sector and host governments when possible. Full review report, and the original source file, can be found in CORE e-library with the code CORE1039.

  • Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) & Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) –study for the Royal Thai Customs (RTC)

    16 February 2015

    Summary:

    This article is about Assisting Royal Thai Customs, RTC, to improve the popularity of the Thai AEO program among the economic operators; as well as about guiding RTC in preparing for a future AEO MRA negotiations, primarily with the European Commission Directorate General of Customs and Taxation. The findings on and the outcomes of this article (as well as the full report behind it, available for download on CBRA´s web-site, as of 18.2.2015), can be useful for CORE Risk-cluster and for Other-cluster, in particular WP19 Education and training. This article is published in parallel in CBRA´s supply chain security blog (in two parts, on 16.2 and 19.2.2015), next to the CORE WP18 Information Observatory pilot.

  • Material Handling Logistics US Roadmap (CORE1038)

    16 February 2015

    Summary:

    This report describes the conditions and circumstances the Material Handling and Logistics (MH&L) Industry is likely to face in the coming years up to 2025. This report might impact all CORE Demo WPs concerned with US transports containing a hinterland leg, depending on the actual layout of the trade lane. The WPs having visibility, planning of transports, resilience with future tracking systems, the theme big data and predictive analytics in focus might benefit from this report. As usual, you can find the full analysis, with the original report, at the CORE e-library, with the code CORE1038.

  • Review of Critical Issues in US Transportation, 2013 (CORE1037)

    16 February 2015

    Summary:

    CRITICAL ISSUES IN TRANSPORTATION, 2013, Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the National Academies. This report might impact all Demo WPs concerned with US transports containing a hinterland leg, depending on the actual layout of the trade lane. From the six areas - Reliability, Innovation, Environment, Safety, Funding, and R&D investment - the first three might be taken into account for CORE. Coding is CORE1037, in the e-library of the CORE-project.

  • Guidelines Procurement of Goods Works and non-consulting services, World Bank (CORE1026)

    10 February 2015

    Summary:

    World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms & Individuals, 2014, and Guidelines Procurement of Goods, Works and non-consulting services, 2014. The World Bank lists firms and individuals that are ineligible to be awarded a World Bank-financed contract because of infringements against fraud and corruption policy. Fraud and corruption policy is described in the Procurement Guidelines or the Consultant Guidelines. Full review and sources files are coded as CORE1026.

  • Consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions (CORE1025)

    10 February 2015

    Summary:

    EU Sanctions are restrictive measures against third countries, individuals or entities that are used as a policy tool to support Common Foreign and Security Policy. Specific EU Sanctions are stipulated by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Especially, the sanctions are directed to prevent financing of terrorism and they set obligations for both the public and private sector. Full review and sources files are coded as CORE1025.

  • Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, the UK (CORE1024)

    10 February 2015

    Summary:

    Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 is available to General Public at the website managed by the national Archives on behalf of HM government. Relevant mainly for CORE WP19 on education and training. Full review and source files are coded as CORE1024.

  • The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, US (CORE1023)

    10 February 2015

    Summary:

    FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.). The document underlines corruption as a facilitating element for other crimes such as human trafficking and smuggling. Relevant mainly for CORE WP19 on education and training. Full review and sources file are coded as CORE1023.

  • Resolution on combatting corruption in Europe, 1996 (CORE1022)

    10 February 2015

    Summary:

    Resolution on combating corruption in Europe. (1996). Official Journal C 01 , 22/01/1996 P. 0443. Refers to criminal organizations and their interest to influence on supply chain operators in order to execute criminal activities. Relevant mainly for CORE WP19 on education and training. Full review and source files are coded as CORE1022.

  • Commonly trafficked goods & socio-economic negative impacts (CBRA blog on 14.1.2015)

    09 February 2015

    Summary:

    What are typical socio-economic negative impacts caused by violations / non-compliance with import/export fiscal rules, restrictions and prohibitions? This entry provides a high-level summary on the negative impacts, primarily derived from a vast pool of practitioner and academic literature. In the CORE-project, this is quite important at least for the impact assessments, and future policy recommendations – i.e. WP1 and WP19.

  • Crime displacement in global supply chains, by Dr. Daniel Ekwall (CBRA blog on 1.2 and 5.2.2015)

    09 February 2015

    Summary:

    Dr. Daniel Ekwall from Sweden is a well-known researcher in the field of supply chain security, including in cargo theft with the many curiosities linked to it. In this interview Daniel shares his views on crime displacement – i.e. what may happen when security is increased in one spot of a supply chain - both from theoretical and from practical perspectives. Within the CORE-project this is relevant information at least for the Risk-cluster, and for WP19 on education and training.

  • Organised crime is now Italy’s biggest company (News on 4.3.2014)

    08 February 2015

    Summary:

    The Italian Mafia make more money than the country’s biggest company ENI – and run at a 56% profit margin. Within the CORE-project, this is just nice-to-know information, feeding primarily to WP19 Education and training.

  • UNODC interview on the Container Control Program, CCP (CBRA blog on 18.1.2015)

    08 February 2015

    Summary:

    Ms. Nicole Maric and Mr. Ketil Ottersen of UNODC were kind enough to share their views on the Container Control Program - originally for the CBRA blog on supply chain security and trade facilitation. Regarding the CORE-project, this is useful information at least for the Risk-cluster, as well as for Demos in the maritime sector.

    What is the Container Control Program, CCP, about? More than 600 million global container movements are reported annually. Research indicates that only 2% of those containers are physically inspected. In this regard, the CCP has an important role to play to address the risks and to facilitate legitimate trade. The selection and inspection of containers remains a great challenge for law enforcement agencies due to the high volume of containers being transported around the world. The Programme establishes Port Control Units, PCUs, in selected sea and dry ports by integrating various enforcement bodies into a single representative unit. The units are trained to identify, select and control high risk containers, based upon risk analysis and other modern risk management profiling techniques. Selected officials from various law enforcement agencies working in a port are trained in areas of transnational organized crime, including drug and precursor trafficking, counterfeit goods, environmental trafficking, as well as in security-related issues, such as smuggling of strategic goods, explosive precursors, nuclear material and weapons. Their systematic cooperation clearly increases the potential of all entities involved in risk profiling.

    Origin, funding, 2015 focus and future plans with CCP? The Programme started in 2004, developed jointly by UNODC and the World Customs Organization, WCO, with four pilot countries, Ecuador, Senegal, Ghana and Pakistan. The activities are funded through voluntary contributions by Member States. Our three biggest donors are in alphabetical order: Canada, EU and US. The focus in 2015 will be environmental crime and the expansion of the programme activities to the air cargo area. We are currently working in the border management area with 51 countries and are targeting to reach a total of 75 countries before 2020.

  • Announcement of the Trusted Trader Program Test in the US (on 16.6.2014)

    08 February 2015

    Summary:

    This entry deals with a multi-agency initiate in the United States, where the Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in collaboration with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), has started to test the Trusted Trader program. This can be of high relevance for CORE Risk-cluster, and for those Demos dealing with multi-agency controls.

  • Review on OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery (CORE1021)

    08 February 2015

    Summary:

    The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention establishes legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and provides for a host of related measures that make this effective. It is the first and only international anti-corruption instrument focused on the ‘supply side’ of the bribery transaction. Within the CORE-project, it is relevant at least for WP19, education and training. The full review is presented in CORE1021.

  • Completely knocked-down, CKD, vehicle imports into Thailand (CORE2000)

    07 February 2015

    Summary:

    What does the Thai legislation say exactly on how completely knock-down (CKD) vehicles need to be imported? What is the background of these legislations and differences? What are expected developments in these legislations ad in the transport of CKD in general? This entry provides some answers to these questions, relevant in particular for the CORE Demo WP11. The detailed document in the CORE electronic library is coded as CORE2000.

  • Export product / commodity maps

    05 February 2015

    Summary:

    An interesting web-source for multiple regional maps highlighting the main export products for countries around the world. Can be useful in CORE WP19, for the education and training materials.

  • Crime taxonomy

    04 February 2015

    Summary:

    Summary: This article presents a high-level classification of typical illegal activities in global supply chains, divided into 2+1 main categories: moving in the supply chain; acts against the supply chain; and crime facilitation. Within the CORE-project, this can provide “food for thought” at least in the Risk-cluster, possibly also in the Demo-cluster.

  • ACC3 regulation in the EU (CORE1000)

    03 February 2015

    Summary:

    This review is about aviation security validation regulation in the EU. ACC3 refers to Air Cargo (or mail) Carrier operating from a 3rd country into Europe, aiming to provide a holistic approach to the threats of such inbound cargo. This review can be beneficial for the Demo-cluster in CORE, including WP12, WP15 and WP17. The analysis (with the 8-step method) is presented in full in the document CORE1000.